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ABSTRACT
In this thesis I distinguish between two conceptions of naturalism that have been offered as
possible starting points for a virtue based ethics. The first version of naturalism is characterized by
Philippa Foot’s project in Natural Goodness. The second version of naturalism can be found, in various
forms, among the works of John McDowell, Martha Nussbaum, and Rosalind Hursthouse. I argue that
neither naturalistic approach is entirely successful on its own, but that we can fruitfully carve a path
between both approaches that points the way to a positive ethical account. I then conclude with a brief
sketch of what such a positive account of a virtue ethics may look like.
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Chapter I: Introduction - Two Sorts of Naturalism, Revisited
John McDowell, in his paper entitled “Two Sorts of Naturalism,” distinguishes his version
of a naturalized ethics from the version espoused by Philippa Foot. According to McDowell, Foot
seeks to ground her ethics in a scientific realism that is wholly external to our own human
perspective. In other words, Foot’s ethical position is grounded in extra-ethical scientific facts,
facts that do not require our understanding or knowledge in order for them to be true. McDowell
counters this form of naturalism with his own version, which takes for its ground the internal and
evaluative ethical perspective of the practically wise agent, or phronemos. Naturalism, as it is
commonly understood, aligns most closely with Foot’s project, and part of the task of this thesis
will be to show how McDowell’s project can be productively understood as a form of naturalism.
The more important consideration, however, is which of these projects offers the most promising
starting point for a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. It is the aim of this thesis to revisit the
distinction that McDowell has introduced in order to investigate the promise found in both
versions of naturalism as well as their respective limitations. For the most part my argument will
be negative, pointing out what each respective theory cannot do. Ultimately, though, I see great
promise for a naturalized virtue ethics and it is the goal of this thesis to point to what such a
naturalized ethics must look like.
I begin my thesis with an account of Foot’s version of a naturalized ethics. This account
will follow closely the text of her most fully developed position as it is laid out in Natural
Goodness. Part of my argument in this chapter hinges on what I take to be an unclear picture of
nature and what sort of access we have to it in Foot’s argument. I believe Foot’s naturalism relies
on a metaphysical realism in the form of natural kinds. If this is the case then her position can be
criticized from two sides. First, a robust metaphysics is serving as an assumed premise in the rest

2

of her argument. While this is not a reason to reject her position outright, it does give us reason
to expect an argument for such a metaphysics, an argument that she does not provide. This leaves
her position incomplete, possibly irredeemably. Second, even if we allow the metaphysical
premise, it is not clear that natural kinds can be used in the same way, or are as normatively
illuminating, when the discussion shifts from plants and animals to humans.
While I take the above criticisms to be compelling reasons to call into question a large
portion of Foot’s argument, I believe there is still a great deal of promise in her project. Her book
can still be useful in understanding how a theory of normative agency can be given if we have
the sort of access to natural facts that Foot believes we do. In short, even if we reject Foot’s
stable, scientific version of natural human life, her account of rational agency still gives us a
promising framework in which to understand moral actions otherwise grounded.
One may ask what other form of moral ground is open to us from which we could find
Foot’s depiction of moral agency useful? The answer, I suggest, following McDowell, is a form
of moral realism that develops out of our already-acquired ethical perspective1 when it undergoes
a Neurathian-style evaluation. A description of such a process forms the third chapter of this
thesis. In this chapter I will argue that McDowell and Martha Nussbaum give us an illuminating
description of how we pre-theoretically undergo the process of moral development. However,
both McDowell and Nussbaum want to claim that from this description of moral development,
coupled with ethical reflection that takes place within the ethical framework itself,2 a form of
moral realism can be offered. I will argue that McDowell and Nussbaum have weakened ethical
stability to an extent beyond which any reasonable conception of moral realism can be applied.
I do not see this as a fatal flaw in their argument, though—a point I will take up in the
1

This is an ethical perspective with which we are always already engaged. McDowell takes the stance that our prereflective ethical beliefs cannot simply be discounted in favor of some purely theoretical stance.
2
What McDowell likens to Neurathian Reflection.
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fourth chapter. I look to Rosalind Hursthouse as a philosopher who has recognized the
limitations on both sides of the naturalism debate and has tried to find a way between them.
Ultimately, I will argue, she falls into a similar trap as McDowell and Nussbaum; however, the
attempt she makes points in the correct direction. In the concluding chapter I take these
limitations and Hursthouse’s suggestion to get past them and try to carve out a possible positive
account of the virtues from a qualified naturalist position. I offer only a sketch to be further
developed, but I see in an earlier paper by Nussbaum a helpful precedent for such a project.

4

Chapter II: Towards a Natural Foundation for Normativity
1. Introduction
Philippa Foot has written recently about how natural facts concerning what it is to be a
human can play a foundational role for our understanding of the virtues. In Natural Goodness,
Foot attempts to ground our moral statements on natural facts about our species. In the same way
that an oak tree is good only insofar as it has the traits that allow it to flourish qua oak tree, a
human is good insofar as she has the traits that allow her to flourish qua human. Shifting the
conversation away from what she takes to be non-natural, metaphysical conceptions of good and
bad and placing the emphasis on evaluative conceptions of good and bad as they pertain to
natural facts, Foot believes she can account for human virtues and vices in a way that avoids the
challenges presented by non-cognitivists specifically and moral skeptics generally. In this
chapter, I will argue that Foot’s depiction of a natural normativity provides us with helpful
guidance in our moral conversation, particularly in that it provides a framework for moral
evaluation that is firmly rooted in experience. Ultimately, however, I will argue that Foot
inadvertently slips back into an assumed metaphysical position, replacing metaphysical
conceptions of good and bad with a reliance on a metaphysical realism in regard to natural kinds.

2. Foot’s Natural Normativity
Foot is looking for what she calls a “fresh start” for moral philosophy. She hopes to
extricate moral philosophy from what she believes is a wrong-headed approach taken by
subjectivists, prescriptivists, and expressivists, all of whom she places under the banner of noncognitivism.3 Foot acknowledges the difficulty non-cognitivists are trying to tackle, which she

3

Placing all these theories under the category of non-cognitivism is problematic. Subjectivism, the position that
most closely aligns with Foot’s subsequent description, allows that moral statements can be true or false for the
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describes as the Humean requirement for our moral philosophy to be practical, or action
guiding.4 However, she believes that non-cognitivists went at the problem from the wrong “side.”
She writes:
What all these theories tried to do, then, was to give the conditions of use of sentences
such as ‘It is morally objectionable to break promises’ in terms of something that must be
true about the speaker. He must have certain feelings or attitudes... Meaning was thus to
be explained in terms of a speaker’s attitude, intentions, or state of mind.5
In short, if someone makes a claim that uses moral language, what they are actually saying is that
they have some reason to act in that particular way. Foot begins by pointing out a problem with
such a theory. She argues that a gap opens up between moral judgments and assertions. An
assertion can be true so long as it corresponds to some fact out there in the world. But moral
judgments, on the non-cognitivist view, have reference only to subjective states. They are true
only insofar as they correspond to the mental state in the subject. Such a view may be able to
describe the action-guiding nature of claims such as “It is morally objectionable to break
promises” but it fails to capture the truth of the statement. The truth of such a statement, Foot
believes, is to be found external to the will of the subject and in the world in which the action in
question is to take place. Foot concludes: “It is the mistake of so construing what is ‘special’

subject who makes them. Non-cognitivism holds that moral ‘statements’ are not statements, strictly speaking, at all,
because they are not truth functional. As such, prescriptivism and emotivism fall under the heading of noncognitivism while subjectivism remains importantly distinct. However, this important distinction is not
acknowledged by Foot, who writes: “This is the subjectivism—often called ‘non-cognitivism’—that came to the
fore with A.J. Ayer, C.L. Stevenson, and Richard Hare, informed the work of John Mackie and many others, and has
lately appeared, refreshed, in Allan Gibbards ‘expressivist’ account of normative language.” (Foot, Natural
Goodness, 8). For the purposes of this thesis (and, arguably, for Foot’s project as she has in her argumentative
sights both subjectivism and non-cognitivism) this oversight is not problematic. However, I think it is important to
flag.
4
Hume writes: “‘Tis one thing to know virtue, and another to conform the will to it. In order, therefore, to prove,
that the measures of right and wrong are eternal laws, obligatory on every rational mind, ‘tis not sufficient to show
the relations upon which they are founded: We must also point out the connexion betwixt the relation and the will;
and must prove that this connexion is so necessary, that in every well-dispos’d mind, it must take place and have its
influence; tho’ the difference betwixt these minds be in other respects immense and infinite” (Hume, A Treatise of
Human Nature 3.1.1.22). Of course Hume concludes that no move directly from the rational to the willed can take
place.
5
Foot, Natural Goodness, 8.
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about moral judgement [sic] that the grounds of a moral judgement do not reach all the way to
it.”6 Someone may coherently reject the moral judgment of another simply because they do not
share the requisite feeling or attitude. In Foot’s words they lack the “‘conative’ state of mind”
that is required for moral agreement as well as to explain the action guiding nature of the moral
judgments necessary if we are to account for moral failures.
Foot denies that such a gap between moral judgment (here beliefs about what is right and
wrong) and assertion (here statements that connect with facts about what is the case) exists. She
believes that “Hume’s demand [that moral claims be action guiding] is met by the (most unHumean) thought that acting morally is part of practical rationality.”7 If our practical rationality
is to be action guiding, it must have some criterion by which it guides our actions rationally. This
criterion, Foot maintains, is wholly natural. She believes that moral statements such as “It is
wrong to break promises” and prudential statements such as “One should not live a sedentary
lifestyle” have the same rational basis in human flourishing. Failure to recognize the rational
basis that grounds either statement will result in one’s failure to flourish as a member of the
human species. It is on this point that moral judgments are supposed to connect with facts about
the world. Much of this discussion relies on Foot’s use of G.E.M. Anscombe’s description of
“Aristotelian necessities”. An “Aristotelian necessity”8 is something that is necessary for a
particular thing, insofar as it belongs to a type, in order for it to be a successful member of the
type in question. For this reason ‘good’ attaches to these necessities. 9 For a bee to be a
successful bee it must be part of a colony. It is then good for a bee to be part of a colony, and for
its behavior to conform to its role in the colony. Foot believes that this can be extended to the
6

Foot, Natural Goodness, 8
Foot, Natural Goodness, 9.
8
These are sometimes called “Aristotelian categoricals.” I will use these terms interchangeably throughout the
thesis.
9
See Foot, Natural Goodness, 46; Anscombe, “On Promising and its Justice,” 18.
7
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discussion of what we are as humans and what Aristotelian necessities we may, therefore, have.
She points to such things as memory and concentration, which allow us to learn a language. She
also points to our social nature and our dependence upon one another. This dependence leads to
an other-regarding attitude that is necessary for our own success. If I know I depend on other
people to flourish, then it would be irrational not to act in certain ways that take others into
consideration, for instance by telling the truth and keeping promises. Here we can see how
Aristotelian necessities link with what is good qua human in the very natural sense that they
promote human flourishing. Dispositions to tell the truth and keep promises, insofar as they
promote a human life that is choice-worthy, map onto what we refer to as virtues, while
dispositions that tend to hinder flourishing map onto what we refer to as vices.10 A human being
should cultivate those dispositions that promote a flourishing human life if she is to act in
accordance with practical reason.
Again, much of Foot’s discussion here can be understood in light of historical differences
in our usage of so-called moral terms such as ‘should’ and ‘ought’ pointed out by Anscombe in
her paper, “Modern Moral Philosophy.” In this paper Anscombe argues that ‘should’ and ‘ought’
lack any special moral sense in Aristotle’s ethics. Instead, they are better understood as
indicating what is good or bad in a prudential sense. It is bad for machinery to run without oil, so
we ought to keep our machinery oiled. There are certain behavioral or intellectual dispositions in
humans that are bad for their development or flourishing, so we ought not develop such
dispositions.11 In modern moral philosophy, however, this understanding of terms such as
‘should’ and ‘ought’ has taken on a new, law-like conception so that when it is said that someone

10
11

Foot, Natural Goodness, 15-16.
Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” 30.
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ought to perform some act, a sense of obligation is implied.12 It is this sense of ‘ought’ that
allows the much-discussed gap between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ to open up.
As Hume rightly points out,13 there is no necessary connection between what is the case
and what “ought to be”—what we are under obligation to do. One is not obligated either to
maintain or change what is the case; what is the case says nothing, or nothing necessary, about
what ought to be the case.14 What motivates human action is whether or not we want something
to be the case. However, if we keep to the Aristotelian sense of ought, as Anscombe and Foot
suggest, we can still speak of what ought to be the case in regard to what is necessary for
successful operation or flourishing without making the illegitimate move Hume warns against.
Here we can say: “If one wants the machinery to keep running then one ought to put oil in it.”
This statement is action guiding only if the agent wants to keep the machinery running, but it is
true insofar as it is the case that oil is necessary for the machinery to keep running. The judgment
now is of one’s practical reason given one’s desire to flourish.

3. Foot’s Teleological Move
Naturalism in teleological ethics, then, is supposed to indicate what is necessary in order
for a human to flourish. But what is it for a human to flourish? In order to get some indication of
how Foot answers this question we first need to look at her conception of natural teleology in
general. There are two ways in which we can speak of an oak tree being good. We can discuss

12

Anscombe tracks this shift in meaning through our religious history and its incorporation of ethical notions in
divine law.
13
I recognize that to assert Hume is correct in this matter is a contentious presupposition on my part. I feel I am
justified in making this presupposition on the basis that if we reject Hume’s dilemma, claiming we can move readily
from an “is” to an “ought,” then the majority of the issues this thesis is dealing with, as well as the issues the authors
with which this thesis is concerned are dealing with, become non-problems. By working from within this
presupposition I hope to provide a meaningful discussion of neo-Aristotelian ethics regardless of the position one
holds in regards to Hume’s dilemma. The best way to do this is to argue from this, more difficult, perspective
14
Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, 3.1.1.27
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what a good oak tree is as it relates to human projects. A good oak tree to someone who runs a
sawmill is one that is straight and thick such that it provides a valuable source of lumber. Or, if
the human is an artist, a good oak tree may be dead and interestingly gnarled such that it
provides an aesthetically pleasing subject matter for a canvas. In each of these cases, one
answers what is good in an oak tree, or what ought to be the case in an oak tree, with a qua X
statement where X is some project other than the oak tree’s flourishing. To put it in terms used
above one may state: “If one wants to produce lumber, then the oak tree ought to be thick and
straight.” But what is it to be a good oak tree qua oak tree? This is not a fundamentally different
question, but it requires us to shift our perspective from that of human projects to that of the life
of an oak tree. What sort of life is a good life for an oak tree? A life of successful survival and
reproduction form the most direct answer to this question and as such can be seen as the telos of
oak trees. A good oak tree is one that has the characteristics that enable it to survive and produce
more oak trees. We can meaningfully speak of the function or purpose of particular tree activities
in light of such a telos. As such, for an oak tree to have roots that are strong and spread out in
such a way that they effectively pull nutrients and water from the ground, and to have leaves that
are green and broad so as effectively to pull in energy from the sun, is to have the characteristics
that make for a good oak tree qua oak tree. It is, therefore, from something’s telos that evaluative
accounts concerning characteristics or attributes can be given.15 It is important to note here that
an aspect of Foot’s theory is that the species in question directly informs the way the telos can
meaningfully be fulfilled. An oak tree that failed to produce acorns but successfully reproduced
in some other fashion could not be said to be fulfilling its telos as an oak tree.
Teleological explanations of this sort are easily given for something as simple as an oak
tree. However, these sort of explanations get more difficult as the species under discussion
15

Foot, Natural Goodness, 46-47.
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becomes more complex, a fact that Foot only indirectly touches upon. Bees, for example, have
different roles to play in regard to the success of the hive and so different characteristics are good
depending on what that role is. Here, for instance, we may be able to give a general description
of a good bee as one that acts in such a way that it benefits the hive in regard to survival and the
production of more bees. Particular characteristics such as being a good gatherer of pollen and
being effective at communicating to other gatherers where the pollen can be found would be
characteristics by which we would evaluate whether a worker was a good worker bee. However,
if we were to evaluate a drone none of these characteristics would describe what it is to be a
good drone. From these distinctions we can see that we can give natural descriptions of
normative characteristics with varying degrees of specificity determined by the complexity of
species in question. Normative descriptions of bees in general requires a degree of generality to
be built in. If we move to the particular, and question whether an individual bee is a good bee,
this generality does not really get at the question. We need to take into account the complexity
found in the species of bee, identify the bee in question in its relation to this complexity, and
evaluate the bee in accordance with this more specific list of natural characteristics it ought to
have.16 Ultimately though, a set of characteristics is the set the bee ought to have because those
are the characteristics peculiar to that type of bee insofar as they promote the success of the hive
in general.17 Despite the fact that the description of what characteristics a particular bee ought to

16

In actuality the complexity that would be necessary to describe accurately what characteristics are good
characteristics for particular types of bees to have, be they drones, workers, or queens, would also have to take into
account the different jobs each type has at particular stages of development. Workers in particular have certain jobs
that change as they mature. This fact goes some distance toward showing how natural descriptions of normative
characteristics in particular members of a species can get extremely complicated very quickly.
17
My point here is not that as we move to greater generality the goodness somehow detaches from the individual
and is to be found instead in the hive. Rather, my point is that the characteristics of a particular bee that make it a
good bee are only explicable in terms of the role those characteristics play in the community of bees that make up
the hive. Foot makes much of Peter Geach’s claim that “Men need virtues as bees need stings” (see Foot, Natural
Goodness, 35). Bees only need stings if their life is to be understood, in terms of going well or badly, in a way that
takes the success of the colony or hive as a relevant factor in this life.
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have can get extremely complicated, Foot believes we can still say that what grounds that ought
is a teleological claim about the bee species and the function that characteristic plays in regard to
such a species.

4. The Metaphysical Presupposition of Foot’s Argument
Foot’s conception of teleology relies upon stable natural facts upon which she can base
normative claims. However, one might reasonably think that placing nature into species and
classes in terms of their characteristic ways of getting along might itself be a human project.18 If
so, then giving an account of what it means for a particular member of a species to flourish is a
human understanding. If Foot’s argument is to get off the ground she needs to cut off this
possibility, claiming instead that there is a stable ordering of species external to both our own
human conception of nature as well as particular instantiations of nature. In other words, our
conception of nature seeks to mirror the external fact of the matter regarding species by
extrapolating from commonalities found in particulars. But this fact of the matter of species is
neither our conception nor the particulars from which our conception is derived. Foot’s
discussion of members of a species flourishing qua the species in question makes this reliance
apparent. We cannot speak of a particular member of a species flourishing or failing to flourish
qua the species in question and expect such a statement to have the sort of stability that Foot
seems to think it has, if the conception of such a species does not exist external to our own
project of describing nature in particular ways.
To give an example, tree squirrels live a predominately solitary life, they breed about twice
a year and the female looks after the young. According to Foot, in order for a tree squirrel to be

18

This statement can be taken in one of two ways. Either there are no natural kinds or understanding the world as if
there are natural kinds is a human idiosyncracy. The implications of both possibilities will be taken up below.
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described as flourishing it must be living a life where these characteristics are realized. This is
not simply a claim about what is required for tree squirrel flourishing, it is also a claim about
what we even mean when we say something is a tree squirrel. For this reason, if a male squirrel
stayed with the female squirrel and they raised the young in tandem, we can make sense of
saying the male squirrel is in some way defective and not flourishing qua tree squirrel (even if
the male’s behavior promotes the survival of the baby squirrels). We can do so by referring to the
characteristics that play a role in the fulfillment of the teleology of members of the tree squirrel
species. But the only way that such evaluations work is if there is some concept, external to all
particular instantiations (of tree squirrels) by which the particulars are to be judged. A male tree
squirrel, behaving in a way that it actually promotes the well-being of its offspring, would seem
(at least on an account that takes into consideration its own particular goal) to be flourishing.19 If
one wants to say otherwise, the criteria by which one judges flourishing must be external to the
apparent goal of the particular life about which a judgment is being made. In other words, the
tree squirrel is defective only when considered against our understanding of tree-squirrel
teleology.
Someone may counter, and in fact Foot does, that all we need is a general enough account
of what is necessary for a particular species to flourish. She writes: “The history of a species is
not, however, the subject with which Aristotelian categoricals deal. Their truth is truth about a
species at a given historical time, and it is only the relative stability of at least the most general
features of the different species of living things that makes these propositions possible at all.” 20
This general account would allow for aberrations in behavior so long as that behavior could still
be seen as, in some way, fulfilling some, more general, Aristotelian categorical. But such a

19
20

See Foot, Natural Goodness, 42. This point will be taken up further in the next section.
See Foot, Natural Goodness, 29.
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solution weakens the teleological description of a species to such a degree that it leaves it
without any explanatory power. Foot wants to determine species by their life form, here
understood as Aristotelian categoricals and the functional role those categoricals play.
Continuing in Foot’s words: “[A]ll the truths about what this or that characteristic does, what its
purpose or point is, and in suitable cases its function, must be related to this life cycle. The way
an individual should be is determined by what is needed for development, self-maintenance, and
reproduction: in most species involving defense, and in some the rearing of their young.”21 If we
characterize species in this way we seem to lose the explanatory power we think we have in
species descriptions. Any behavior or characteristic that I can in some way describe as
contributing to a particular animal’s reproduction or survival qualifies as a species description.
But this cannot be right as it allows for far too much variation.
So it seems we are left with a claim by which species descriptions include behavior and
characteristics which are only arbitrary (in the sense that they could be otherwise and not effect
the survival or reproduction of the particular animal, but that these characteristics still count as
characteristics of the species in question). Only by maintaining this claim can we maintain
species parameters understood as common (but not universal) behaviors and characteristics of
living things. This claim, while by no means absurd, can only be supported from two possible
positions. The first is that there is a form of “tree squirrel” out there in the world in some sense
that the particular squirrel is imperfectly instantiating. If this is the case, then one would expect
some argument from Foot for such a strong metaphysical position.22 I am not here making any

21

Foot, Natural Goodness, 32-33.
This would also put Foot precariously close to a Platonic conception of forms, which would, I think, be absurd.
But it seems clear to me that she is tied to a type of species realism, probably one that puts her closer to the second
possibility I take up.

22
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claims concerning the possibility of such an argument;23 I am merely pointing out that if this
were her position, it would not be convincing until such an argument is given. The other option
is that the concept ‘tree squirrel’ is an artifact of human science, and by the lights of this science
this particular squirrel is acting deficiently. In this case it is not a tree squirrel24 teleology that is
in question but rather a human concept. If this is the case then Foot’s teleological arguments
speak more to what we are as humans than what nature is like in itself. I mention this objection
here merely to show that, as it is, Foot’s natural teleology is incomplete.25 In the next chapter I
will provide an argument for why I think any attempt to complete it will confront problems. I
move now to a discussion of how Foot implements her teleological framework for human
normativity. I think this argument runs into a separate problem, but I want to emphasize that
ultimately I think Foot gets something right. Precisely what this is will become apparent through
the course of the thesis.

5. The Teleological Move as it Pertains to Humans
I briefly sketched above26 how naturalism is supposed to answer the non-cognitivist’s and
moral skeptic’s challenge: Hume demanded that morality be action guiding. Non-cognitivists
answer this challenge by arguing that when moral language is used by a speaker it expresses
some attitudinal or intentional state of mind within the speaker, and it is this intentional state that
explains the reason the individual has to act “morally.” But, as Foot argues, this is hardly
satisfying to anyone who wants to say that morality provides reasons to act in a certain way,
23

McDowell does argue against the possibility of any such argument, which I will take up in the next chapter.
One could argue that I am not even justified in using the term ‘tree squirrel’ to denote anything other than the
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reasons that are communicable to others. A non-cognitivist may simply shrug her shoulders and
say she is not moved by those reasons because she lacks the requisite intentional state. Foot
introduces practical rationality within a teleological framework as the answer to the Humean
challenge. It is not the attitudinal or intentional state that should be action guiding, it is practical
rationality. Of course, in order for our rationality to guide us it needs certain criteria. Such
criteria are found in Aristotelian necessities. An Aristotelian necessity is something that is
necessary for a particular thing, insofar as it belongs to a type of thing, in order for it to be
successful in what it is. This brought us to a discussion of ‘should’ and ‘ought’ and the peculiar
shift in meaning these terms have undergone in modern moral philosophy in that they have
acquired a sense of obligation. This sense was distinguished from the non-obligatory, projectoriented sense that can be seen in sentences that take the form: “If one wants to φ then one ought
to Ψ.” To Ψ is not obligatory, but if one does in fact want to φ then one has a practical, action
guiding reason to Ψ. Foot’s natural teleology fills in φ with “flourish” as it pertains to each
particular species in question. These Aristotelian necessities refer to the teleological project of
flourishing as it is understood in the species in question, and the actions of any particular
member of the species must be evaluated based on this species-centered teleological project.
Foot believes that this natural normativity framework can give us a meaningful, actionguiding justification for why we should cultivate certain character traits (i.e., ‘virtues’) and reject
others (i.e., ‘vices’). The question is whether such a teleological understanding of species can be
made to fit human nature in the same way it does species in the non-rational botanical and
zoological worlds.27 It is important to note that when filling in the sentence: “If one wants to φ
then one ought to Ψ” in light of a particular non-rational individual in a species, we cannot
27

Bracketing my concern in the last section and allowing that Foot’s natural teleology does in fact work in these
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legitimately say that the individual recognizes a practical, action-guiding reason to Ψ. We can
recognize that there is such a reason, but the individual can be judged by us as good or bad,
successful or unsuccessful, only in terms of its successful (or unsuccessful) fulfillment of its
telos. But when it comes to humans, we are capable of recognizing practical, action guiding
reasons for Ψ-ing. Furthermore, we are the species for whom projects are an open question. I
can choose one project28 over another and have that project be part of what it means to be a
flourishing human being. Foot writes:
What conceptually determines goodness in a feature or operation is the relation, for the
species, of that feature or operation to survival and reproduction, because it is in that that
good lies in the botanical and zoological worlds. At that point questions of ‘How?’ and
‘Why?’ and ‘What for?’ come to an end. But clearly this is not true when we come to
human beings.29
If an individual human cannot reproduce that may be seen as a defect;30 however, a human can
choose not to reproduce and it not be a defect. The questions to ask at this point are, “What is it
about humans that makes this possible?” and, “Does this possibility prevent us from applying the
criteria of natural normativity, understood as teleological explanations for certain necessary
features, to humans in the same way we have done to botanical and non-rational animals?”
Foot believes the difference between human and non-human animals (and plants) comes
down to complexity. As such, no fundamental changes need to be made when applying the same
natural teleological arguments to either non-rational animals or humans, so long as the
complexity of a human life is taken into account. On my reading of Foot, in the same way that it
is more difficult to give a proper account of the features or characteristics that go into a
28

It seems every human action can be explicable in terms of a larger project, which in turn is explicable as being
part of one’s sense of a good human life.
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Foot, Natural Goodness, 42.
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This too is open to debate. One aspect of this chapter that I want to emphasize is its focus on the human ability to
evaluate one’s own life and find meaning given the facts of that life. Someone may find equal or greater meaning in
the adoption of a child than they would have in giving birth to a child. This ability consciously to shift one’s projects
in light of environmental developments seems uniquely human.
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description of a good bee (given the different ends each particular bee may have) than it is to
give the same type of description in regard to an oak tree, it will be more difficult to give a
proper account of what characteristics or dispositions humans should have in order to flourish,
given the complexity of what it means for a human to flourish and the different means each
human may take in order to realize such flourishing, than it is to give any such account for nonrational animals. In Foot’s own words:
In spite of the diversity of human goods—the elements that can make up good human
lives—it is therefore possible that the concept of a good human life plays the same part in
determining goodness of human characteristics and operations that the concept of
flourishing plays in the determination of goodness in plants and animals.31
This is a rather optimistic view, and in order to support it one hopes that Foot would give a
description of what goes into a flourishing human life or telos. It is my contention that this hope
is realized only imperfectly in Foot’s account. Before I move on to this argument, though, it will
be helpful to show what sort of detail Foot does provide for her project.

6. Natural Normativity in Action
I begin this section with a lengthy quote from Foot, because I think it shows clearly what
she leaves open in her investigation of human good. She writes:
[The h]uman good must indeed be recognized as different from good in the world of
plants and animals, where good consisted in success in the cycle of development, selfmaintenance, and reproduction. Human good is sui generis. Nevertheless, I maintain that
a common conceptual structure remains. For there is a ‘natural-history story’ about how
human beings achieve this good as there is about how plants and animals achieve theirs.
There are truths such as ‘Humans make clothes and build houses’ that are to be compared
with ‘Birds grow feathers and build nests’; but also propositions such as ‘Humans
establish rules of conduct and recognize rights’. To determine what is goodness and what
defect of character, disposition, and choice, we must consider what human good is and
how human beings live: in other words, what kind of a living thing a human being is.32

31
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Foot, Natural Goodness, 44.
Foot, Natural Goodness, 51. Emphasis added.
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She moves from this statement concerning the human good to a discussion of practical
rationality, understood as the capacity to recognize reasons for particular actions in light of their
relation to the human good. But we still have to ask the question: Where have we established
what the human good, the good that practical rationality is supposed to direct us to, is? She
writes33 that she has already suggested the grounds on which a human being could be appraised
as a bad (defective) human being, namely, that which does not promote the human good, but
such an answer is not informative.
It may be possible to glean, from certain examples used by Foot, a meaningful description
of how she views the human good. She has, for instance, at several points gestured at what may
be a start to pinning down specific Aristotelian necessities for the human good. In this section, I
will attempt to derive from these Aristotelian necessities a sketch of what the good may look
like.
One example Foot uses is the type of larynx that allows for the production of sound
necessary for language, as well as the mental capacity such that we can understand language and
use it ourselves.34 She writes:
There are, for instance, physical properties such as the kind of larynx that allows of the
myriad sounds that make up human language, as well as the kind of hearing that can
distinguish them…Without such things human beings may survive and reproduce
themselves, but they are deprived. And what could be more natural than to say on this
account that we have introduced the subject of possible human defects; calling them
‘natural defects’ as we used these terms in the discussion of plant and animal life?
From this we can gather that Foot believes language plays a role in the good human life and
certain necessary features (larynx shape, ability to hear, and mental capacity) need to be present
if the human has any hope of achieving this good life.
She takes this argument a step further, bringing her comments closer to our general notion
33
34

See Foot, Natural Goodnes, 53.
Foot, Natural Goodness, 43.

19

of morality, when she discusses promise keeping. Here she focuses on our social nature and
remarks that “much human good hangs on the possibility of one person being able to bind
another’s will by something in the nature of a promise or other contract.”35 She goes on to
characterize promising as “mak[ing] use of a special kind of tool invented by humans for the
better conduct of their lives, creating an obligation that (although not absolute) contains in its
nature an obligation that harmlessness does not annul.”36 I have certain reservations about
agreeing with Foot’s discussion of our capacity for speech as an Aristotelian necessity,37 but her
comments concerning promising seem absolutely correct to me. There remains a question,
however, as to what makes them correct. Foot alludes to,38 and here I will expand upon, the fact
that humans are a remarkably needy species. Human infancy is extremely long when compared
to the infancy of other species, and it takes years for us to reach a level of maturity at which we
can be self-sufficient. In addition, we have needs for food and clothing, shelter, as well as
education.39
All of these factors point to a great degree of complexity in our relation to our environment
and our survival. Furthermore, as Foot has already pointed out, while survival in one sense is
necessary for the human good it is not all that goes into the human good. We have to add to this
certain other factors, for instance friendship and love, as well as the ability to enter into personal
projects not directly pertaining to survival. All of these things rely on our ability to trust others.
Humans need to delegate tasks to ensure that all our needs for survival are met. Trust that these
jobs will be completed requires the “tool” of promising. Finally, if we have any hope of
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Foot, Natural Goodness, 45. Again Foot notes her indebtedness to Anscombe’s “On Promising and its Justice.”
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See Foot, Natural Goodness, 45.
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achieving not just survival but also a good life that contains creative projects, we need leisure
time. This leisure time can only be ensured through cooperative efforts within the society. From
this, we can see that the tool of promising plays an extremely important role in human life.
Putting this into Foot’s discussion of natural normativity, the ability to make and keep
promises needs to be present if we hope to achieve a good human life. Practical reason is
supposed to recognize promise keeping as an Aristotelian necessity and guide actions
accordingly. Presumably, what grounds this whole framework are the natural facts concerning
the particular neediness of humans in regard to our relationship with the environment, taking into
account as well the needs beyond survival that must go into a description of the good human life.

7. Rationality and the Problems it Poses to Natural Normativity
In the last section, I looked to Foot’s examples to build an explanation for why promise
keeping is an Aristotelian necessity, which, when recognized as such by practical reason,
becomes action guiding in that it is a disposition one ought to promote. I now want to go back to
what I said earlier concerning Foot’s belief that the distinction between natural evaluations of
plants and animals and natural evaluations of humans is one simply of complexity. What grounds
the evaluative criteria of natural normativity is the teleological description one can give for each
species. The end is flourishing, and what goes into this flourishing will depend on the species. In
order to begin to give a description, we have to ask what characteristic way of living that species
has.
Now the question is: Can we give the same sort of description of a characteristically human
way of living? There are facts about our existence, but it seems impossible to give an account of
the necessary role these facts play in a human life. We adapt and change, often finding new and

21

better ways to live. We are not static in the way we live as other animals are. What makes
plasticity in human life possible is that we can rationally investigate the way we are living and
make changes where we think changes are called for. This ability to re-evaluate on-the-go, so to
speak, makes it very difficult to give any general description of human life.40 If we cannot give
such a description then it seems Foot’s project, while possibly supporting virtue-type language,41
fails to fix what those virtue terms mean in particular situations.
Looking back to the example Foot uses concerning an ill-formed larynx, we can see that
individuals with such ‘handicaps’ often live remarkably flourishing lives, and this is possible not
despite their ‘handicap’ but because of it. When someone confronts a physical abnormality in
such a way that it is made into an asset we can see where the analogy between human and nonhuman animals breaks down. A mute human who embraces the mute community and who finds
meaningful work in aiding others to embrace their physical abnormality in the same way can be
seen in many ways as being better set up to develop the dispositions or character traits necessary
to live a flourishing life than some individuals who do not have any such abnormalities.42 Given
the openness of possible human lives, sometimes it is the case that having an abnormality that
must be either embraced or overcome can serve to make apparent to the individual what is
important and what is not when evaluating one’s life. Those who have never been forced to
perform such an evaluation of their own life may in fact be at a disadvantage. This possibility is
one Foot seems to ignore. For this reason an abnormality need not always be described as a
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Beyond its simply being guided by reason. Foot clearly wants more than this, and for good reason. Why reason
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handicap, and, most importantly, we can make sense of a person who claims she would not
exchange her life with the abnormality for one in which it was absent.
In plants and animals, abnormalities may arise that cause us to question what is or is not
naturally normative for a species in terms of the teleological account of that species. Ultimately,
though, we think there is a fact of the matter in this regard. However, by means of our
rationality, we humans actively redefine our conceptions of natural human behavior and the ends
towards which it ought to aim. Rosalind Hursthouse describes the problem thus: “But in virtue of
our rationality...we are different [from animals]. Apart from obvious physical constraints and
possible psychological constraints, there is no knowing what we can do from what we do do,
because we can assess what we do do and at least try to change it.”43 Alternate possibilities can
always present themselves to our rationality. What at first may have appeared to be an
Aristotelian necessity (the shape of a human larynx for example) can drop away in a new, still
human, form of life.44 John McDowell takes this point a step farther, writing: “As soon as we
conceive nature in a way that makes it begin to seem sensible to look there for a grounding for
the rationality of virtuous behaviour, the supposed grounding is in trouble from the logical
impotence of ‘Aristotelian categoricals [necessities].’ Reason enables a deliberating agent to step
back from anything that might be a candidate to ground its putative requirements.”45 Human
functioning is remarkably varied, and trying to pick out certain traits that make for optimal
human functioning seems to be a lost cause. We can always take certain ways of living and
improve upon them, or see opportunities for living better in situations that at first seem to inhibit
43

Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 221. She is not making the claim that I have no way of distinguishing my actual
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flourishing. For this reason, it seems there is no one recipe for the best way to live a human life
in the same way that there is for plants and non-rational animals.
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Chapter III: An Internal and Evaluative Naturalism Through Neurathian Reflection
1. Introduction
In the last chapter I argued that Foot’s naturalism relies on a teleological account of species
realism concerning human nature that exist external to our own moral outlook. By external here I
am referring to Foot’s belief that a general enough statement can be made concerning human
nature that, regardless of what we believe to be ethical, that statement would hold true; or, to put
it another way, if our ethical beliefs are true they are so because of these natural facts. I
suggested that such a view becomes problematic when we allow for a pluralism of types of
human lives and the role reason plays in overcoming what would otherwise be considered
obstacles to flourishing. Furthermore, I called into question the teleological framework Foot
relies on in order to express stability in nature, stability that seems necessary if her project is to
find objective moral truths.
In this chapter I will investigate how we might be able to provide a type of moral realism
without reliance on teleological categorizations of nature. This argument relies on radical,46
rational ethical reflection upon our own acquired moral beliefs. Several philosophers have
offered versions of such a thesis, and part of my task here will be to put these different versions
into conversation, piecing together what I take to be the most promising aspects of each in order
to create a coherent whole. In order to do so I will first look at the positions put forward by John
McDowell and Martha Nussbaum.47 Ultimately, I will conclude that the type of naturalism
presented by these philosophers does provide us with a criteria by which we can pick out virtues
and vices, one that avoids the problems I have argued Foot’s naturalism falls into. However, the
claim that a full blown moral realism is achieved remains questionable.
46

“Radical” here is McDowell’s description. I take it to be radical in the sense that it holds no principles as
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2. McDowell’s Argument Against an External View of Natural Facts
John McDowell, in “Two Sorts of Naturalism,” distinguishes between a naturalized ethics
that seeks validation through “independent facts, underwritten by nature, about what it is for a
human life to go well”48 and a naturalized ethics that works from within one’s formed character,
seeking validation only in “radical ethical reflection” upon those same character traits and how
they relate to one another, in order to understand what it means for a human life to go well. He
worries, and I have argued, that Foot’s position is aligned with the first form of naturalism.
Moreover, he argues that a desire for such a naturalism comes from a misreading of Aristotle
made possible by the effect Kant has had on our thinking. This misreading has resulted in a
skewed understanding of objectivity. By recognizing the Kantian influence on our thoughts
about nature, McDowell argues, we will be better able to confront the question of how Aristotle
himself sees the virtues as naturally grounded.49
So, what is this Kantian influence that we need to recognize in order to escape? A full
explication is beyond the scope of this paper and, of course, has already been given by
McDowell himself in the aforementioned article. However, the crux of the issue, in McDowell’s
own words, is that “[t]he ineffable ‘in itself’ in Kant’s picture performs the function of satisfying
a felt need to recognize something wholly alien to subjectivity; and Kant’s insight that the
natural world, just because it is not ineffable, cannot take over that function.”50 A new way of
looking at the world became possible with Kant’s philosophy. We are asked to entertain the
existence of the world devoid of our own, human, rational influence. Such a move makes
48

McDowell, “Two Sorts of Naturalism,” 167-8.
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possible the position that the world as we know it is a product of this human rational influence,
the stance taken by transcendental idealism. However, this leaves us with the realization that
while we can entertain the possibility of the world existing devoid of our intellectual influence,
we a fortiori have no intellectual access to this world. That our claims about nature are grounded
only in our human understanding introduces a desire to give them further grounding in some
objectivity external to this human understanding.51 When we discover the ‘in-itself’ cannot serve
this purpose, we seek “disenchanted nature” as the next best thing. This gives rise to the
scientific approach and the pedestal upon which it is placed. McDowell writes: “The
investigative stance of science discounts for the effects of features of the investigator, even his
humanity ... [W]hat science aims to discover is the nature of reality in so far as it can be
characterized in absolute terms: the content of the view from nowhere.”52
McDowell argues that it is from the scientific perspective that we have interpreted Aristotle
as seeking an objective natural ground for morality. The standard interpretation of Aristotle is
that he is grounding his ethics on human nature, understood as certain objective facts
discoverable by science about what we are and how we function. Foot, I have argued, can be
understood as being tied to this line of argument. McDowell argues that if this perspective is
peculiar to modern philosophy, it is illegitimate as an interpretive model for Aristotle.
Furthermore, if it runs into serious issues concerning its viability as an ethical foundation, then
we have good reason to look elsewhere to understand what grounds our normative statements.
He goes on to suggest that if we remove the idealistic stance whereby nature is some
conglomeration of the ‘in-itself’ and our own understanding, dropping this “hankering” for the
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‘in-itself’ altogether, then “the thesis that the natural world is in the space of logos [our
understanding] need not seem to be a form of the thesis that thought makes the world.”53 By
removing the idealistic thesis and allowing for a conception of objectivity that does not preclude
the subjectivity of the thinking questioner we can come to an ethical validation that respects our
being situated within nature.54 Ethical reasoning then takes place from within this situated human
perspective, and it has for its fodder those moral beliefs with which it is already engaged.

3. Nussbaum’s Internal and Evaluative, “Self-Validating,” Arguments
The Aristotle we get from such an interpretation is remarkably similar to the Aristotle
described by Nussbaum in “Aristotle on Human Nature and the Foundations of Ethics.”
Nussbaum’s paper targets Bernard Williams and his interpretation of Aristotle in particular.55
She picks out three theses of Williams’ interpretation against which she will argue, all of which,
I believe, may be applied to Foot’s position as well. William’s first thesis, according to
Nussbaum, is that the essential human nature56 for Aristotle is a natural scientific fact that can be
grasped from “the totally external viewpoint of a neutral observer—from, as [William’s puts it in
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Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy], ‘an absolute understanding of human nature.’”57
Furthermore, essential human nature, and the natural scientific facts of which it is composed, is
stable (i.e., it cannot be changed by humans themselves). Second, essential human nature is not
open to the same sort of controversy that ethical questions are open to. There is a fact of the
matter concerning what is necessary for a good human life, and this fact is discoverable by
scientific inquiry and is objective for this reason. And third, this essential human nature does
important ethical work. Its source, external to human opinion, provides “fixed points that
effectively rule out certain ethical alternatives.”58 Importantly, Williams argues that these are
theses held by Aristotle himself, and ultimately it is the first thesis that, Williams argues, forces
us to reject Aristotle’s ethics.59 Nussbaum counters that Aristotle has no such conception of an
external foundation for ethics, nor even science for that matter. The type of investigation
Aristotle pursues takes for granted that all investigation is performed internal to a human
perspective. She writes: “to find out what our nature is seems to be one and the same thing as to
find out what we deeply believe to be most important and indispensable [i.e. the internal
perspective from which the inquiry begins].”60 A little further on she writes: “Human nature
cannot, and need not, be validated from the outside, because human nature just is an inside
perspective, not a thing at all, but rather the most fundamental and broadly shared experiences of
human beings living and reasoning together.”61
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The question now turns to how we come to recognize these fundamental experiences that
are to serve as the natural foundations for our ethics. Nussbaum seeks to show that Aristotle’s
ethics are grounded in endoxa, what she takes to be the reasoned beliefs of wise individuals.62
She rejects any attempt to ground ethics on a foundation external to our own beliefs, and fully
embraces the fact that a viewpoint is always already presupposed in any investigation into what
it means to be human. In order to motivate her position, Nussbaum begins with some passages
from the Nicomachean Ethics that discuss the proper way we should wish for the good of our
friends and for ourselves. The passages are worth quoting at length as they introduce
Nussbaum’s strategy well. She writes:
If it is well said that a friend wishes goods for his friend for that person’s own sake, then
that person will have to remain the type of being he is. Then it is to him as a human being
[or: on condition of his remaining a human being] that the friend will wish the greatest
goods.63
and
Being is a good thing for the good person, and each person wishes good things for
himself. But nobody would choose to have everything on condition of becoming other—
as, for example, the god right now has the good. He will wish to have the good while
continuing to be whatever he is.64
The important feature of both of these passages is that they point to a limitation concerning what
can be considered good for a person. If what is wished for would prohibit someone from
maintaining her identity as a human being, an identity that is based solely on one’s beliefs about
what it means to be a human, then it does not make any sense for that person to wish for that
thing, because it would not be that person who succeeded in obtaining it.
62
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Importantly, this identity must be established communally.65 Nussbaum’s next move is to
give two paradigm cases for how we may acquire a communal conception of humanity that will
serve as a foundation for non-relative moral beliefs. She frames these cases as “self-validating”66
arguments for our rational and social nature. Aristotle defines a human being as a rational and
social animal, so Nussbaum looks for endoxic foundations for components of our nature.67 The
first of these arguments looks to Plato’s Philebus in order to illustrate the importance we place
on rationality in our understanding of humanity.68 The dialogue asks what the good is for a
human being. The contenders are pleasure, knowledge, and some combination of the two such
that, when they are put together, they form a third. In order to see whether pleasure or knowledge
could be sufficient for the good of man, Socrates suggests looking at each separately from the
other.69 He asks Protarchus whether he would want to live a life experiencing nothing but
pleasure. Protarchus answers in the affirmative. Socrates then asks whether he might have some
need of knowledge or intelligence. Protarchus answers that he does not see why he would need
either if his life was one of nothing but the greatest pleasure. To this, Socrates answers that if
Protarchus were to be devoid of knowledge and intelligence he would also be ignorant about the
very question of whether or not he was enjoying himself. Without memory, Protarchus could not
experience anything but the present moment, so he could not say if he has enjoyed himself.
Without the ability to judge, Protarchus would not be able to tell whether or not he ever is in fact

65

I mean communal in the broadest sense possible. Ultimately Nussbaum believes her position gives us reason to
reject any sort of relativism.
66
What she means by “self-validating” will be discussed below.
67
I am using ‘humanity’ here to denote the necessary conditions for one’s being a human being.
68
One may reasonably ask why we need to look to Plato if the argument is meant to be Aristotelian. First,
Nussbaum takes the Philebus simply to be a good example of the point Aristotle expresses in the above quotes.
Perhaps Aristotle produced his own literary examples in some of his lost works, but as all that are left are his notes I
think this is a justified supplementation on the part of Nussbaum. Second, my goal is to judge the promise of this
approach in a contemporary ethics, so any interpretive qualms one may still have of Nussbaum’s use of this example
should not apply to my case.
69
Plato, Philebus, 20e.

31

enjoying himself. And finally, without the ability to calculate, Protarchus could not look towards
future pleasures.70 From these results, Socrates argues “[y]ou would thus not live a human life
but the life of a mollusk or of one of those creatures in shells that live in the sea.”71
Nussbaum sees important ethical work being done in this argument. She stresses that
Socrates’ questions are always formed as direct questions to Protarchus. The question is not
whether some hypothetical person could choose such a life, but whether Protarchus could. This,
she argues, is part of the internal evaluative process that goes into the question of what is the
human good. Protarchus cannot give an affirmative answer to the question whether he would
choose such a life because he could not choose the life while maintaining his own conception of
what it means to be human. He identifies himself as a member of human kind, and in wishing to
live the life of pleasure alone he would be wishing to live a life that is outside of his own
conception of what it means to be human. Protarchus could not choose such a life for himself
because it would not be him who was successful in living such a life.72 In Nussbaum’s own
words: “The good life for him (for us) must first of all be a life for him (for us).”73
The argument can go the other way as well. We could not live the life of pure intellect, a
god’s life, for similar reasons. The life of pure intellect fails because we cannot, as humans,
choose such a life. Such a life would be that of some rarified being alien to humanity and all of
its beliefs and concerns. One may be able to acknowledge the good of such a being, but it is not a
human good, so one could never wish it for oneself qua human.74 Here we find the boundary at
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the opposite end of the spectrum. It is as inconsistent for an embodied human to wish for the
pure intellect of a god as it is for her to wish for the simple pleasures of a mollusk. Any
definition of the good life for a human, eudaimonia, will fall somewhere between these two
limits. Nussbaum calls this form of argument “internal” and “evaluative” because it never
departs from the opinions held by the individual. What it does, is refine these opinions by
making apparent the inconsistencies that they often contain; this refinement then makes clear to
the individual that he or she already has internally motivating reasons for certain actions—
reasons that were simply concealed by other pre-reflectively held opinions.
Above I said that Nussbaum describes the internal and evaluative position of human nature
as “self-validating.” Before moving to her argument concerning our social nature and mores,
which are supposed to be self-validating in the same sense, I need to show what she is pointing
to with this description. Nussbaum believes the argument’s “procedures embody a respect for
practical reason; they acknowledge the importance of practical reason to living humanly well.”75
When we perform the evaluative process, we place a degree of value on practical reason. That
practical reason is then valued in our conception of what is required in order to maintain human
identity should not be surprising. The position states that there is a circularity in our argument
concerning what human nature is, but that this circularity is not problematic because it brings to
light what we are unable to change without a complete shift in what it means to be human. We
cannot enter into the investigation of what it means to be human without presupposing, and
Aristotle’s ethics is immense and beyond the scope of this paper. I will limit myself to pointing to what is said
immediately after the above-mentioned lines. Aristotle remarks: “Life in conformity with the other kind of virtue
[moral] will be happy in a secondary degree, because activities in accordance with it are human” (NE 1178a10-11).
One cannot live a purely intellectual life and still be human. This does not keep us from recognizing the higher godlike good of the intellectual virtues and fostering them, but it does call into question whether or not it is at all
rational to wish to be such a god oneself given Nussbaum’s argument. It seems impossible that such a commitment
could be held without self-contradiction and it is not clear that Aristotle himself is suggesting that it ought to be
attempted. Regardless, such considerations fall under the interpretive question, which I have said is not part of my
goal here.
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giving a certain value to, practical reason as an integral part of the conclusion. This
presupposition is brought to light through the investigation itself, but it is also confirmed in the
investigation. For this reason, a rejection of the conclusion would have to be a rejection of the
entire project because it would force us to say the very asking of the question is illegitimate. The
answer to the question “what does it mean to be human?” is, in a crucially important way, built
into the very asking.
The second “self-validating” argument concerns our social nature and how we get brought
into social mores through social situations themselves. Nussbaum begins this argument by
pointing to the role that myths and theatre played in the ethical development of the ancient
Greeks.76 She argues that the fictional transformations from human to god, god to human, human
to animal, and animal to human serve to delineate the boundaries between what can and cannot
be given up or taken on without our ceasing to be what we are. When we see these lines crossed
in stories and plays, we are forced to reflect on our own socially constituted beliefs concerning
what is considered human. These definitions may be narrower than the ones discovered in
Plato’s Philebus because they entail a social conception that may be more refined. To take one
example of several from Nussbaum, consider the Cyclops. These beings are described as mostly
human in shape. Among the differences that distinguish the Cyclops from the human lie in the
Cyclopses’ complete disregard for one another. When we hear stories of the Cyclops, we can
evaluate what it is about them that keeps them from being human. One necessary requirement for
being human that the Cyclops fail to meet is found in their inability to enter into social
engagements. We find such an ability peculiarly necessary for our identity as human. The
process of reflection and evaluation itself is communal because it takes place within society. We
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go to the play to see the story, and in going we are surrounded by others. “The communal nature
of this reflective process, and the fact that it works through emotional responses to tragic events,
suggests that the process of participating in the exercise is already an affirmation of its
content.”77 Once again, the means by which the argument is presented presupposes the
commitments that we find necessary for our continued identity. “The ‘argument’ is selfvalidating in a deep way; you cannot withdraw your assent from its conclusion, without
withdrawing from the entire form of life that, as a procedure, it embodies.”78
Nussbaum believes that both “self-validating” arguments, the first for our rational human
nature and the second for our social nature, are identical in form. This form consists in the
necessary presupposition of the conclusion such that when the argument is complete and we
recognize the circularity we gain a further understanding that the method of argumentation is
what justifies our use of the conclusion as a premise. The argument could not proceed in any
other way.

4. McDowell and Nussbaum: The Same Sort of Naturalism
While Nussbaum has provided us with a form for understanding the foundations of
naturalism understood as internal to and evaluative of our own beliefs (endoxa), she only
suggests what the content of such a naturalism may be.79 What form does our social nature take,
and, more importantly, is this the form it ought to take? Following Nussbaum we answer the first
part of this question with our pre-theoretical social and moral beliefs. But this answer forces us
to ask how we are to know those beliefs are in fact the right ones to have, which leads back to
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McDowell’s discussion of conceptual schemes and the internal evaluation they undergo through
Neurathian reflection. I turn now to a description of this process and an argument for how we can
fruitfully see it as an extension of Nussbaum’s foundation.
McDowell looks back to Aristotle’s espoused method of investigation for his ethics.
Aristotle asks whether we should start from first principles or work our way to first principles
from what we already know, concluding that the latter method, working our way back to first
principles, is the only feasible way to make a study of ethics. What are these first principles?
Aristotle writes: “For the facts are the starting point, and if they are sufficiently plain to him, he
will not need the reason as well; and the man who has been well brought up has or can easily get
starting points.”80 One’s upbringing is indicated as the starting point for all ethical inquiry,
meaning one must always begin from an acquired ethical perspective. I take it that what is being
suggested here is the way into the circle of the self-validating argument.
According to McDowell, we can then evaluate this acquired ethical perspective from the
inside in order to determine whether or not it is correct. We can do so because our habituation
into an ethical perspective is not simply rote learning or behavioral training. Instead it is an
introduction into a conceptual framework.81 We come to learn what actions are the right actions
given the framework of the virtues. From this we come to an understanding of what McDowell
calls the that of an ethics. We understand that this is the right action in this particular
circumstance. Our upbringing allows us to pick out and take enjoyment in performing virtuous
actions because such actions are understood as noble. When we have this sort of habituation we
have the that of Aristotle’s ethics.
If we left things here Aristotle would seem susceptible to a charge of leaving his ethics
80
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without any hope of objectivity whatsoever. However, McDowell’s suggestion, and this seems
supported by what Aristotle says at NE 1095b3-9, is that once we have the that of a conceptual
ethical framework we can then move to the because, the point at which we come to understand
why these virtues are in fact the right ones.82 This move requires an honest examination of one’s
conceptual framework from the inside. McDowell likens it to Socrates’ call to an examined
life.83 It is through this move that Aristotle escapes dogmatic acceptance of one’s ethical
perspective. Certain supposedly virtuous actions are called into question in light of our other
beliefs. In this way we can internally evaluate what we have acquired through habituation.
McDowell introduces the model of Neurathian reflection to the ethical conceptual
framework provided through one’s upbringing to illustrate this point. If we cannot get outside of
our acquired ethical perspective then we must try to fix it from the inside.84 The metaphor of
Neurath’s boat is supposed to show how such an examination of our ethical beliefs is to take
place. The idea is that once one has been brought into the conceptual framework, in other words
once one can recognize, occasion by occasion, what the correct action is (the that or starting
point of NE 1095b3-9), then one can begin to see how it all hangs together in a coherent ethical
picture. Once one has reached this point the next move is to begin to question elements of that
picture in light of other elements of that very same picture. McDowell writes: “In this version of
the image [of Neurath’s boat], the fact that the boat cannot be put ashore for overhaul stands for
the fact that when one reflectively moves from mere possession of the that to possession of the
because as well, one has no material to exploit except the initially unreflective perceptions of the
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that from which the reflection starts.”85 It is the task of practical reason then to facilitate the
move from the that to the because, and in understanding the because one stands on firm ground
concerning the truth of one’s ethical perspective.
An important step is made in opening one’s ethical perspective up to such a Neurathian
evaluation and possible revision. According to McDowell it is in this that we are able to maintain
a form of moral realism. He writes: “[I]f a collection of putative perceptions of the that has run
that risk and passed muster, that is surely some reason to suppose that the perceptions are
veridical.”86 We get validation of our ethics through such a Neurathian evaluation and we have
no reason to ask for more (nor any evidence that more than this sort of certainty is possible).

5. What Sort of Ethical Realism?
Given such a picture of ethical discourse the question that needs to be asked is: How do we
know when we are getting it right? If all we have are our beliefs, and any ethical discourse has
commerce only in these beliefs, it seems that ethical discussions could dissolve into irredeemable
relativism. To put the problem into McDowell’s framework, there might end up being multiple,
self-contained conceptual schemes, each giving their own definition of human flourishing in a
language the others cannot understand. Continuing with the analogy of Neurath’s boat, we can
make sense of the crew repairing the boat only if we include some knowledge within the minds
of the crew of what a boat is and how it is supposed to operate. The sailors must have an idea of
the purpose or limitations of a boat before the repairs they make upon their vessel can be
successful. In other words, there is a certain structure that makes a boat a boat, and before we go
about making repairs we need to come to some understanding of this structure lest we wind up
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with an airplane when we are finished.87 It seems that without this understanding there can be no
repairs, only arbitrary changes. The situation is the same with ethics. We need some picture of
what our ethics are supposed to do before we can go about repairing them, or have any sense of
when we are successful. Aristotle places eudaimonia in this position; our ethics are a necessary
condition for our living the good life for humans. I have been arguing that the main distinction
between the naturalism offered by McDowell and Nussbaum and the naturalism offered by Foot
can be traced to how we understand eudaimonia. Foot’s naturalistic answer looks to external and
objective facts concerning the human species. She argues that there is a characteristic way in
which humans live their lives, and from this characteristic way we can develop a firm
understanding of what eudaimonia is. McDowell and Nussbaum look to a socially constructed
conception of eudaimonia that seems to lack any (necessary) sense of stability. If the concept of
eudaimonia is an open ended one, subject to constant revision through the above described
Neurathian reflection, then it can hardly serve as a blueprint for that very same Neurathian
reflection. In this section I will investigate how much of a foundationalism we can ascribe to
either McDowell or Nussbaum’s position, and what this means for their ethics.88
Nussbaum claims to be providing a foundation through her account of self-validating
internal arguments. However, even she recognizes that the foundation is not one that gets its
strength from some inherent nature of human beings; instead, it gets its strength from the inquiry
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through which it is discovered. Looking back to the example of Protarchus in the Philebus, she
writes: “[A]lthough it is, in principle, open to Protarchus to reject its conclusion [the importance
of practical reason for living well], he cannot consistently do so without opting out of the form of
life that the Socratic procedure exemplifies.”89 This shows that the foundation provided by
Nussbaum is a foundation only for a human who accepts certain norms and practices already,90 in
this case the norms of practical reason, and not an understanding of being a human qua human
(where ‘human’ here indicates some natural fact external to human beliefs). While this does
indeed get us a good deal in terms of mapping out ethical inquiry, it also leaves us without a way
to evaluate (and offer guidance to) humans who reject those norms outright. There is no small
difference between Nussbaum’s foundation of accepting practical reason as part of our self-given
identity and Foot’s maintaining that practical reason is a natural fact about humans. The
distinction between Foot’s naturalism and Nussbaum’s has immense repercussions in regard to
what we can say with certainty concerning morality. For instance, Nussbaum acknowledges that
Philebus does “opt out” of the norms governing practical reason and ethical inquiry, and for this
reason we cannot say that he is inconsistent. As such, our ethical evaluations do not really touch
him. We are forced to say that Philebus’ form of life lies outside our ethical purview of a human
life (‘human’ here understood as the internal structure of norms that form our identity). The
result is that Philebus is consistent, and I, in calling Philebus sub-human,91 am consistent, but the
two of us in relation to one another’s respective beliefs are irredeemably inconsistent. That such
radical ethical difference could exist between two beings seems highly implausible. On the other
hand, Foot’s naturalism, as it makes universal statements about what it means to be human, can
still evaluate Philebus’ life in light of its relation to what it means to be human. Most
89
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importantly, Foot’s naturalism allows us to make moral judgments that touch other agents, even
if those agents themselves do not understand how, or accept that they do.
Another worry for Nussbaum’s use of such a conception of a foundation is that it sets her
up for a form of historical relativism. If our identity is defined by our practices, and this identity
forms the ‘foundation,’ what happens if our practices change over time? We could develop
radically different practices and yet the narrative of these changes would remain intact. This
means one identity is not given over to another, but rather the same identity undergoes
fundamental changes over time. What was moral for humans at one time would no longer be
moral, and we could not look back on humans in the past and judge them according to our
contemporary norms.92 These contemporary norms simply do not comply with the human
identity at that past time. Without some fixed conception of what it means to be human such a
predicament is possible given the foundation provided by Nussbaum.
Rosalind Hursthouse discusses this problem in relation to the Neurathian project. She
writes: “For, in theory, Neurath’s boat might, over many years, become like Theseus’s ship,
without a single plank of the original remaining. And then, in a manner of speaking, we, or our
descendants, could look back at the ethical outlook within which we started and condemn it in
retrospect as all wrong.”93 She follows this point up in a subsequent footnote, noting, “I say ‘in a
manner of speaking’ because there is some question as to whether we, or our descendents, with
our new outlook, could understand the original one well enough to describe it as ‘all wrong’. We

92

Strictly speaking we could judge them immoral but only in light of our own socially developed understanding of
morality. This is akin to how I can judge Philebus as immoral (or at least amoral) and be consistent. The problem is
that this consistency never touches Philebus or those ‘humans’ from the past. The difference between one internal
point of view and the other does not allow for any communication between them (I take Gilbert Harman to be
offering a relativism similar to this in “Moral Relativism Defended.” Philosophical Review 84 (1975): 3-22. If there
is no implicit agreement then there is no moral conversation, even though I can still shout judgments at the agent).
We have, at the very least, pragmatic reasons to avoid such a relativism. I will show below that we also good
reasons to think that such a relativism simply is not coherent from any perspective.
93
Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 166.

41

might just find it completely incomprehensible, and thereby neither right nor wrong.”94 One must
ask whether any ethical project with this outcome could still lay claim to the name of realism.
My immediate reaction is that it cannot. There are two reasons for why I have this reaction.
First, to suggest that we descended from those who held such an incomprehensible ethical
outlook seems to say too much. If their outlook truly is incomprehensible to us then there is no
reason to think that our ethical outlook in any way descended from theirs. Second, and this is a
point I will develop in the last chapter, it does not seem as though such a radical difference in
ethical outlook is even possible given the necessary existential similarities between us and any
other rational, temporally finite, subject of a life from which we have descended.
To sum up, the two weaknesses I see in Nussbaum’s foundationalism, and by extension
McDowell’s Neurathian procedure, are that we are not provided with a way by which we can
provide reasons for action to those who have opted out of our ethics (or, in McDowell’s
phrasing, our conceptual scheme)95 and that we seem to leave open the possibility of an historical
relativism. In the next chapter I will look to a way by which we might be able to avoid these
problems.
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Chapter IV: Finding a Way Between the Horns of the Dilemma
1. First Nature vs. Second Nature
Thus far I have argued that the various forms of naturalized normativity offered by Foot,
McDowell, and Nussbaum all run into problems. The two sides of the problem I think can be
helpfully illustrated by a distinction McDowell offers between first and second nature.96
McDowell writes:
Nature controls the behavior of a non-rational animal. It seemed that reason compels
nature to abdicate that authority, leaving a void that self-interest seemed fitted to fill. But
now we can see that the way reason distances one from first nature need not invite a coup
d’etat from self-interest. In acquiring one’s second nature—that is, in acquiring logos—
one learned to take a distinctive pleasure in acting in certain ways, and one acquired
conceptual equipment suited to characterize a distinctive worthwhileness one learned to
see for actions, that is, a distinctive range of reasons one learned to see for acting in those
ways.... The dictates of virtue have acquired an authority that replaces the authority
abdicated by first nature with the onset of reason.97
First order nature is the type of nature we discuss when we look at non-rational animals and how
they behave. Their ends are dictated to them by nature and it is this dictation that makes possible
discussion of Aristotelian necessities in reference to them.98 In short, this is the side from which
Foot seeks to ground normativity. Investigations into the first nature of such non-rational animals
are the proper realm of science. Rationality, according to McDowell, severs us from first nature
as it pertains to humans. In its place is what he refers to as our second nature. Second nature can
be understood as the virtues. Knowledge of the virtues is acquired through our taking on a
conceptual scheme in the process of our moral education. We are brought up in particular ways
and taught to value particular things. It is this nature that informs our choices and the
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rationality/morality of our actions.99 Second nature is the proper realm of ethical investigation,
and it is also that which we cannot escape. We cannot get a vantage point outside of our second
nature, so all evaluation must take place from within second nature, hence Neurath’s boat.
I have argued that neither form of naturalized ethics, beginning from either a first or a
second nature, has been entirely successful in its goal, though both have a great deal to offer in
their own way. The question that now needs to be asked is whether reason is really so caustic to
first order nature that nothing from that realm passes into our second nature. Surely not, for while
we are rational, we are also animals. McDowell seems to forget this at times, yet he does
acknowledge that second nature cannot be the only story and accepts that first nature matters
“because the innate endowment of human beings must put limits on the shapings of second
nature that are possible for them.”100 He also writes that first nature facts can be part of what is
taken into account by reflection.101 Putting all this together leaves us with a rather confused
picture of what first nature facts remain after reason has performed its reflection, how those first
nature facts are supposed to limit what second nature ethical positions are possible, and, finally,
how reason is supposed to combine first nature and second nature into a meaningful ethics.
McDowell seems to discount the importance of first nature facts, placing all the emphasis on
second nature and rational reflection; and yet on the other hand he acknowledges that it is our
first nature that provides the shape of what type of life we can consider ethical.
The question is: Where do we place the emphasis in our ethical investigation? Should we
look to first nature facts, as Foot does, or to second nature facts, as do Nussbaum and
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McDowell? Are we to find our ethical foundations internal to our own beliefs concerning what it
means to be human or is there an external truth concerning what it means to be human upon
which our ethics can be grounded? The answer appears to be that neither the internal nor the
external line of investigation are correct in themselves. What we need is some coherent
combination of the two that acknowledges the importance of stable, universal facts concerning
human nature while at the same time allowing for a dynamic, reflective, and plastic process for
how norms can be built upon these facts.102 We need to be able to account for a vast range of
possible ethical lives while still being able to define the parameters of possible ethical lives by
tracing the limits drawn by first nature facts.

2. Hursthouse’s Answer to the Dilemma
Hursthouse gives the credit to McDowell for passing through the horns. She writes:
For either we speak from the neutral point of view, using a scientific account of human
nature—in which case we won’t get very far—or we speak from within an acquired
ethical outlook—in which case we will not validate our ethical beliefs, but merely reexpress them.... I shall assume, without argument, that McDowell is right to claim that
the Neurathian procedure in ethics provides a way between the horns of this dilemma.
The pretensions of an Aristotelian naturalism are not, in any ordinary understanding of
the term, either ‘scientific’ or ‘foundational’.... But, for all that, it may serve to provide
rational credentials for our beliefs about which character traits are the virtues, not merely
re-express them.103
Hursthouse eschews any sense of a strong foundationalism in virtue ethics, yet she remains
hopeful that meaningful criteria for ethical beliefs can be maintained via McDowell’s Neurathian
procedure. However, she takes it a step farther than McDowell, in that she tries to graft Foot’s
naturalism back onto this Neurathian procedure. She sees the goal of virtue ethics as picking out
those traits or dispositions that make a person good qua human being. What is good qua human
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being is open for Neurathian debate, but there is hope that a first order naturalism can inform the
debate in a substantial way.104 She then notes that she has taken over for her own account of
naturalism much of what is said by Philippa Foot, subsequently entering upon a lengthy
exposition of Foot’s position.105 The hope, I take it, that Hursthouse has in utilizing Foot’s
naturalism is, looking back to Neurath’s ship, to inform the crew of the purpose and blueprints of
what a ship ought to be so that any repairs performed can be successful. Such a goal introduces
an important distinction between Hursthouse’s Neurathian procedure and McDowell’s, a
distinction that puts her in a better position to avoid the pitfalls that I have described. She sees
the necessity of having a universal direction to the Neurathian procedure, and she seeks to justify
that direction by adopting Foot’s method, at least in part.
It may seem strange that Hursthouse sees in Foot’s naturalism a helpful ally. After all, it is
precisely such an external foundation in ethics that Foot is pushing and that Hursthouse argues is
a non-starter. But what Hursthouse takes from Foot is the concept of a characteristically human
way of going about things. After going through an explication of Foot’s point that ‘good’ is an
attributive adjective whose criteria for meaning can change with use, and following this point up
with a discussion of how this is illustrated through how we speak of good specimens of plants
and animals (to which she has no problem giving an external foundation; for, after all, they
cannot choose to alter their way of life),106 she moves on to question whether this use of ‘good’
can be extended to humans.
As I mentioned at the end of the second chapter, it is reason that Hursthouse recognizes as
the characteristically human way of getting along. But her argument against Foot was that our
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reason calls into question any other characteristically human traits or dispositions. This is the
negative side of reason’s role in the development of a robust virtue ethics. Hursthouse argues that
reason can also serve a positive role in fixing a conception of the virtues. She writes: “The very
substantial effect of claiming our characteristic way of going on is in a rational way, that is ‘in
any way or ways that we can rightly see we have reason to do’, is that it connects ethical
evaluations, in our own mouths, with our own view about what there is reason to do.”107 Just as
Foot confronts the practicality requirement placed on ethics by Hume, Hursthouse makes reason
the arbiter between our second nature (with ethical claims concerning what dispositions are
virtuous) and what we believe we have reason to do (in order to live a good human life).108 I
believe the point she is stressing is that our ethical claims (in the form of what we assert are
virtues) are normative, and hence action guiding, only if they align with our beliefs concerning
the good human life. If they fail to align with our beliefs concerning what we have reason to do
as humans, then they are irrational. The only way to evaluate our ethical claims is by means of
rationality. In this way normativity finds in rationality a fixed criterion.
But this fixed, first nature account of humans as rational doesn’t get us any further than it
did with Nussbaum’s rational “foundation.” Reason is placed between two contingent conceptual
schemes both susceptible to revision. We have our second nature virtue scheme that we get
through moral education on the one side and some pre-theoretic conception of what it means to
be human and what goes into human flourishing on the other. We fool ourselves into thinking
that the latter is our first nature when really our first nature is mere rationality (“mere” because it
can only operate as an empty formalism) that only gets normative power when it evaluates the
one side in relation to the other. This evaluation can go either way, meaning we can change
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either our virtue concepts or our concept of human flourishing whenever we find that the two
have some rational conflict between them. Thus the only grounds for moral reprobation on this
view is if an individual’s ethical evaluations and their beliefs concerning the good human life do
not align with one another. So long as all of their beliefs do align, we have no way to say that
they are still getting it wrong. Hursthouse sums the position up by making the point that “[t]o
recognize a character trait as a virtue, on the grounds of ethical naturalism, is to recognize the X
reasons for acting people with that character trait characteristically have as reasons, to recognize
them as reasons for oneself.”109 She does not see this as a problem, but simply as an ethical state
of affairs to be minimized through moral education. But when asked whether we could ever
convince a mafioso to adopt our reasons for action she quotes Aristotle’s statement that such a
man “would not listen to an argument to dissuade him, or understand it if he did.”110
What Hursthouse has left us with is a fairly thin conception of ethics. She leaves open the
possibility that my reasons for action will have absolutely no pull on another if their moral
education is fundamentally different from mine. In other words, pre-reflectively, we think that
the mafioso has it wrong, but on Hursthouse’s view the only support for such a claim is precisely
that we have such a pre-theoretical moral viewpoint. If the lynchpin of an ethics lies only in
rational coherence, then two equally coherent yet wildly different ethical systems stand on
equally firm ground. They are like two Neurathian ships passing in the night, each undergoing
their own internal evaluations. Despite all this I think Hursthouse has the right idea in trying to
find some common ground between first and second nature such that we can at least define the
borders of a possible second nature ethics using first nature facts. She simply needs a more
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robust conception of first order nature to give our rationality something to work with. In the
conclusion I will gesture at what sort of ethics we may be able to derive from such a picture.
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Chapter V: Conclusion - Towards an Ethical Realism
1. A Lived Conception of Humanity
The title of this thesis is “The Promise and Limits of Natural Normativity in a NeoAristotelian Virtue Ethics.” Thus far I have focused almost solely on the limits. I have
investigated two different conceptions of naturalism and the role they may play in devising a
coherent virtue ethics and have argued that both have limitations that prevent them from being
wholly successful in this role. My hope, however, is that I have also given some indication of
what is required if we are to continue within a naturalistic framework in devising a virtue ethics.
It is still my belief that naturalism provides the most promising direction to tackle the question
concerning our access to ethical realism. In this final chapter I want to offer a brief sketch of how
we may get between the horns of the dilemma that Hursthouse mapped out but which, I have
argued, she has unsuccessfully navigated.
Both McDowell and Hursthouse recognize that first nature facts constrain possible
conceptions of what is a good human life, but they are unclear as to what first nature facts are
and they look to second nature as doing the important ethical work. Foot seems to be looking for
first nature facts in her development of natural normativity, but she is never clear as to which
specific facts she has in mind; or, when she does draw near to particular facts, they seem not to
be general enough, such that rational doubt concerning their necessity for human life can sneak
in.111 We need to come to some understanding of what is even meant by first nature facts, an
understanding that avoids the pitfalls of being scientific facts only properly accessed from some
Archimedean perspective, but that also maintains a form of stable naturalism.
My suggestion hinges on a lived conception of what we mean when we say someone is
111

The argument from here was that in order to get to a degree of generality that doesn’t conflict with the variety of
lives open to us given our rationality we must dilute natural facts to such a degree that they fail to offer us any real
direction.

50

human.112 There are certain considerations concerning our understanding of what we mean by
human that need to be factored into any ethical perspective if it is to be plausibly adopted. These
are not external scientific facts concerning our species but rather internal limits beyond which the
term ‘human’ loses any recognizable meaning. Much of this is captured in Aristotle’s own
definition of a human as a rational and social animal. From such a definition we can derive many
conclusions concerning what we can and cannot understand as a flourishing or eudaimon human
life. For instance, a human who consistently fails to implement instrumental reasoning cannot be
said to be a flourishing human. Beyond this, a human who fails to recognize the rationality
behind being an honest member of society also cannot be said to be flourishing. This is not (or is
not only) a failure of one’s instrumental reasoning; it is also a failure that is made possible by a
misunderstanding of something built into the very concept of a human being, a concept from
which we necessarily begin. There is a pre-ethical fact concerning the nature of our concept of
what it means to be human. We, as humans, understand a certain value inherent in truth. If we
chose a life that rejected such a value in truth it may still be possible to flourish, but it would not
be human flourishing. In the same way we distinguish non-human animal lives from our own, we
can distinguish between our concept of “human” and a multitude of alternative moral lives that
hang together but not in a human way. We include in our concept of a human certain dispositions
that we have come to value as virtues. This becomes apparent when we say of someone that they
have lost their humanity. In a way, they have ceased to be human because what they value and
what we understand as valued by a human subject have come apart.
Linking this back to Hursthouse’s statement that our Neurathian boat may become like
Theseus’s ship, it seems the analogy breaks down. The possibility that Hursthouse allows for in
this argument requires that we don’t simply swap plank for plank, but that we change the shape
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of the ship completely. If what we value, and the virtues that fall out of such values, were to be
replaced by different values to the point that none of the original values remained, the shape of
our concept of a flourishing member of the species would no longer share any similarities with
what we now mean by human flourishing. The moral life of such a being would not be the moral
life of a human. This lived conception of humanity provides the blueprint for Neurath’s boat. It
may be argued that this only shows the contingency of any conception of being a human, but my
response is that this contingency doesn’t apply to our conception of being human.113 That we
include ethical considerations in our understanding of what it means to be human shows how the
two (ethics and the concept ‘human’) rely on each other in such a way that to give up the one
forces us to give up the other. To deny that our ethics plays such a role in our human concept is
to proceed from some ingrained prejudice that our ethics can be jettisoned while our humanity
cannot, but this simply is not the case. They stand or fall together. What we need is some middle
road that takes seriously the way that non-ethical, natural facts already inform our ethics in a
manner that outlines necessary boundaries for any concept of human flourishing. Importantly,
these boundaries can only be discovered from within our own ethical perspective, not from some
scientific project external to these preconceptions—the perspective I have argued Foot’s position
entails.

2. A Precedent Found in Nussbaum
There is a precedent for the approach I am suggesting. Martha Nussbaum, in “NonRelative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach,” offers certain “facts” of a human life that may
serve to delineate the parameters of a possible Neurathian project. This paper sits in a strange
relation to her paper I was discussing earlier in my thesis, “Aristotle on Human Nature and the
113
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Foundations of Ethics,” in that she acknowledges in the former that “[Aristotle] was not only the
defender of an ethical theory based on the virtues, but also the defender of a single objective
account of the human good, or human flourishing,” further noting that the objectivity of human
flourishing is justifiable through reasons that cut across traditions and practices.114 This seems at
odds with her account of ethical evaluations being necessarily internal to our own particular
ethical outlook as she maintains in “Aristotle on Human Nature;” yet she does allude to how
these two articles can be brought together when she writes in “Aristotle on Human Nature” that
Aristotle insists “that the characteristic operations and excellences of practical reasoning, and our
sociability, are inseparable from the particular ways in which we find ourselves in the world, as
both capable and limited.”115 She goes on to list (in “Aristotle on Human Nature”), briefly,
several facts about human existence that perform such limitations upon human capabilities and
inform our ethical lives. The examples she gives include our mortality, our ability to feel pain
and pleasure, and that we all have certain appetites and desires. Interestingly, she classifies these
facts concerning human nature as internal rather than external, but acknowledges that they are a
“more or less permanent part of the internal perspective of human beings in many times and
places.”116 These comments are made toward the end of “Aristotle on Human Nature,” and she
points to her earlier paper as the fully worked out version of these comments. So it is this earlier
paper, “Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach,” to which I now turn in order to see
how we may be able to bring these multiple threads of ethical inquiry together into a coherent
picture.
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In this paper Nussbaum argues that Aristotle picks out particular common human
experiences concerning which choices must be made. Every human being at one point or another
is confronted with the possibility of bodily harm or death. Every human also experiences
appetites for certain pleasures, has needs that can be met only by resources that are limited, and
lives in a world populated by other humans who have similar experiences. Because these
experiences are common to all humans and all require a choice of some sort, we can ask what it
means to choose well in each case. The application of such words as “courage” when confronted
with an experience threatening bodily harm or death, “moderation” in regard to our appetite for
pleasures, “justice” in meeting one’s personal needs when confronted with limited resources,
give us a ‘thin account’ of the virtues that can be filled in by investigating particular instances
and extrapolating from them a ‘thick’ understanding of what we mean. Nussbaum writes: “The
job of ethical theory will be to search for the best further specification corresponding to this
nominal definition, and to produce a full definition.”117
Nussbaum goes on to give her own list of such experiences or features common to
humanity. She includes on her list mortality, the body, pleasure and pain, cognitive capability,
practical reason, early infant development, affiliation (a sense of human fellowship), and humor.
These are, according to Nussbaum, all experiences or features that any human life will need to
include if it is to be a fully human life, and ethical inquiry seeks to find the best way of
accommodating for these necessities. After providing this list she sums up what she believes we
can achieve from this line of inquiry. She writes: “We do not have a bedrock of completely
uninterpreted ‘given’ data, but we do have a nuclei of experience around which the constructions
of different societies proceed. There is no Archimedean point here, and no pure access to
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unsullied ‘nature’—even, here, human nature—as it is in and of itself. There is just human life as
it is lived.”118

3. Conclusion
While the notion of naturalism we are left with in the project I have described may seem
far removed from what many consider to be nature (understood as what is gotten at through
science), in many ways I see it as a more consistent notion. We understand what it means to be
human not through some pseudo-objective investigation,119 but through actual lived experience.
Granted this leaves any account open a great deal of interpretation; but I believe that so long as it
is done in accordance with a rational, Neurathian style of reflection we have reason to believe
that the ethics that result will not be relative in any pejorative sense.120 We have then, in my
“lived conception of humanity” and Nussbaum’s universally lived experiences, a bridge between
first and second nature. The promise then is that by means of this bridge we can develop a
meaningful form of ethical realism that takes from both sides of the naturalism debate, and in so
doing avoids each of their respective limitations.
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